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Hunt v. Blasius: A Gap in the
Application of the Illinois Strict
Products Liabilty Theory
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally all parties in a product's chain of distribution are
potentially liable defendants in strict products liability suits., How-
ever, several recent court decisions may have significantly altered
this general doctrine by considering equitable principles in allocat-
ing liability among defendants.' In particular, one Illinois Appellate
1. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §402A (1965), states that any person engaged in
the business of selling products for use or consumption can be held strictly liable for damages
proximately caused by those products if they are unreasonably dangerous when they leave
the seller's control. See notes 9 through 14 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the effect of the §402A provisions. All "sellers" of a product are described as being within
the "chain of distribution" of the product as it passes through commerce to the injured user
or consumer.
Since the adoption by Illinois of §402A in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965), the courts have shifted in their analysis from a focus on the chain of
possession of a product to the consideration of the commercial nature of all transactions
involved in a product's distribution to the general public. This shift was demonstrated re-
cently in the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill.2d 393,
389 N.E.2d 155 (1979). In Connelly, the court held that a trademark licensor who was totally
outside the chain of distribution of a product could be held strictly liable for injuries caused
by a product bearing his trademark. The court reasoned that the public policy considerations
underlying its decision in Suvada applied to a trademark licensor as well as a distributor. In
particular, the court noted that trademarks play an integral role in the marketing of a
product, thereby helping to reap profit from the public. Id. at 411-12, 389 N.E.2d at 163. See
notes 7 and 8 infra for a discussion of the public policy considerations referred to by the
Connelly court.
2. The Illinois Supreme Court permitted actions for contribution by manufacturers joined
in strict product liability actions in several cases. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package
Machinery Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E. 2d 437 (1978); Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing Co., 70
Ill. 2d 41, 374 N.E. 2d 455 (1978); and Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70 111. 2d 47,
374 N.E. 2d 458 (1978).
Each of these decisions occasioned a strong dissent by the late Justice Dooley. Because the
effect of these decisions is to allocate loss according to relative fault, a concept alien to strict
liability, Justice Dooley felt that Suvada v. White Motor Co. and all strict products liability
cases following Suvada had been "implicitly overruled". See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div.
Pkge. Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d at 22-41, 374 N.E.2d at 446-455. (Dooley, J., dissenting). However,
it is not clear that these decisions will totally upset the traditional path of strict liability.
The majority in Skinner suggested that any action for apportionment will arise only after
initial liability has been found. "When the economic loss of the user has been imposed on a
defendent in a strict liability action the policy considerations of Suvada are satisfied and the
ordinary equitable principles governing the concepts of indemnity or contribution are to be
applied." 70 Ill. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d 437, 443. See Comment, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice
Division Package Co.: Adoption of Contribution in Illinois, 9 Loy. CHI. L.J. 1015 (1978); Appel
and Michael, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: An Opportunity for Legisla-
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Court has significantly limited the potential liability of a manufac-
turer who acts as an independent contractor.
In Hunt v. Blasius, I the court provided an independent contractor
who manufactured specific non-consumer goods acording to govern-
mental designs with a new defense to a strict products liability suit.,
By balancing equitable considerations, this new defense restruc-
tures the rules governing liability in actions arising from injuries
caused by products made unreasonably dangerous by design de-
fects. 5
This article will briefly outline the origins of strict products liabil-
ity in Illinois and the growing application of equitable principles to
this once rigid area of the law. In this context, the Hunt decision
will be analyzed in detail, and the implications of the new indepen-
dent contractor defense will be discussed.
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN ILLINOIS
The landmark Illinois Supreme Court decision, Suvada v. White
Motor Co. I expanded the concept of strict liability to non-food prod-
ucts liability actions. The court reasoned that the "public interest
in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to pur-
chase the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one
creating the risk and reaping the profit"7 compelled the imposition
of strict liability on the sellers of unreasonably dangerous products.,
Accordingly, the court adopted section 402A of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts.9 That section'0 provides that sellers" of unreasonably
tive and Judicial Cooperation, 10 Loy. CHI. L.J. 169 (1979) for a more complete discussion
on the effect of these three cases on future strict product liability actions.
3. 55 Ill. App. 3d 14, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977), aff'd on other grounds, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384
N.E.2d 368 (1978).
4. Id.
5. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
6. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
7. Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 622-23, 210 N.E.2d at 187.
10. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §402A (1965), provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
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dangerous or defective products 2 may be held liable for injuries
incurred by a user or consumer'3 of their product.
Four essential elements must be proved to establish a prima facie
case of strict liability. First, a defendant must be shown to have
been a seller 4 of the product. Second, the product must be unrea-
sonably dangerous. Third, the product must have been unreasona-
contractual relation with the seller.
Before the decision in Suvada, only food product manufacturers were subject to strict
products liability actions in Illinois. See, e.g., Patagias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. 117.
Suvada extended strict liability to manufacturers and component part manufacturers of non-
food products. By adopting §402A, the court eliminated the requirement of privity of contract
between parties, which had plagued the courts since its inception in Winterbottom v. Wright,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
11. A party is subject to strict liability if that person is "engaged in the business of selling
products for use or consumption." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, Comment f
(1965). However, the rule does not extend to a party who is only an "occasional seller" of a
product which is at issue in a strict liability action. See note 84 infra for a discussion of the
limited liability of "occasional sellers".
The recent decision in Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 I1. 2d 393, 389 N.E. 2d 155 (1979)
demonstrates that the test employed in determining whether a party is a "seller" is not rigid
in its application. See note 1 supra.
12. The determination of whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous" does not rest
upon a finding that there is some element of danger involved in the use of a product. Rather,
the test is whether the product is more dangerous than would be contemplated by a foreseea-
ble user of the product. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, Comment i (1965).
There are a number of defects which may make a product unreasonably dangerous. See
notes 29 through 34 infra and accompanying text.
13. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, Comment 1 (1965), defines a "user or
consumer" as follows:
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, it is not necessary that the
ultimate user or consumer have acquired the product directly from the seller, al-
though the rule applies equally if he does so. He may have acquired it through one
or more intermediate dealers. It is not even necessary that the consumer have
purchased the product at all. He may be a member of the family or the final
purchaser, or his employee, or a guest at his table, or a mere donee from the
purchaser. The liability stated is one in tort, and does not require any contractual
relation, or privity of contract, between the plaintiff and the defendant.
"Consumers" include not only those who in fact consume the product, but also
those who prepare it for consumption; and the housewife who contracts tularemia
while cooking rabbits for her husband is included within the rule stated in this
Section, as is also the husband who is opening a bottle of beer for his wife to drink.
Consumption includes all ultimate uses for which the product is intended, and the
customer in a beauty shop to whose hair a permanent wave solution is applied by
the shop is a consumer. "User" includes those who are passively enjoying the
benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplaines, as
well as those who are utilizing it for the purpose of doing work upon it, as in the
case of an employee of the ultimate buyer who is making repairs upon the automo-
bile which he has purchased.
A "user or consumer" can also be an innocent bystander who is injured by another person's
use of an unreasonably dangerous product. See, e.g., White v. Jeffery Galion, Inc., 326 F.
Supp. 751 (E.D. Ill. 1971); Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972).
14. See note 11 supra.
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 11
bly dangerous when it left the seller's control.'" Finally, the plain-
tiff's injuries must have been proximately caused by the condition
which made the product unreasonably dangerous."
POTENTIAL DEFENDANTS
In a strict liability action, the plaintiff may join as a defendant
almost every party who had a commercial interest in the production
and distribution of the product. 7 Thus, potential defendants may
include manufacturers,' 8 component part manufacturers," sales
representatives, 0 wholesalers,2 ' packagers, 2 bailors-lessors,2 main-
tenance contractors, 2 retailers,2 brokers,2 and licensors.27 Plaintiffs
may, under proper circumstances, recover damages for personal in-
jury or harm to their property caused by unreasonably dangerous
products from any or all of these parties .2
The number of defendants a plaintiff may join in a strict liability
action is dependent on the type of product defect alleged. Illinois
15. If a condition that made a product unreasonably dangerous arose after a particular
seller passed the product on through commerce, then generally, that seller cannot be held
strictly liable for the injuries caused by that condition. See generally Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Il. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 12 I1. App. 3d 165, 298 N.E.2d 289 (1973). Further, the fact that a product has
undergone a substantial change or alteration before it reached the user may protect a seller.
See Whitmer v. Schneble, 29 Il1. App. 3d 659, 331 N.E.2d 115 (1975).
16. An unreasonably dangerous product is not properly the subject of a strict liability
action unless it has caused some injury or damgage. The mere risk of an injury is not sufficient
to hold a seller strictly liable. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill.
1978); Bouillon v. Harry Gill Co., 15 Ill. App. 3d 45, 301 N.E.2d 627 (1973).
17. See note 1 supra.
18. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
19. Id. See, e.g., Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 63 Ill. App. 3d 985, 380 N.E.2d 819
(1978); Wright v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
20. See, e.g., Little v. Maxam, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
21. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61111. 2d 17,329 N.E.2d 785 (1975),
appealed after remand, 61 Ill. App. 3d 898, 378 N.E.2d 618 (1978); Dunham v. Vaughn &
Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
22. See, e.g., Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976). But cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h (1965). (Although the Restatement
drafters believe defective packaging is a basis for liability, they regard the packaging as an
integral part of the whole product.)
23. Profilet v. Falconite, 56 Ill. App. 3d 168, 371 N.E.2d 1069 (1977); Galluccio v. The
Hertz Corp., 1 Ill. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E. 2d 178 (1971).
24. Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 155, 349 N.E.2d 578 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975)
26. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584
(1969).
27. See, e.g., Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979).
28. As parties having an economic interest in the manufacture and sale of a product, all
of these "sellers" are potentially liable for injuries sustained by a user or consumer. See note
1 supra.
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case law recognizes six types of defects which may render a product
unreasonably dangerous: design," manufacture, 0 packaging,3'
warning,32 installation,3 and maintenance.3 ' Of these, the design
defect creates the broadest range of potential denfendants, because
the designer of a product is the first person in the chain of distribu-
tion. Thus, the design defect exists when the product leaves the
control of every subsequent seller and the plaintiff can join everyone
in the "chain", from designer to ultimate seller. 35
However, mere joinder of all sellers in a strict liability action
arising from a defectively designed product does not make any of the
defendants absolute insurers. 3' Although it is difficult for the defen-
dant to totally escape liability, a number of paths are available to
a seller to absolve himself of liability and/or the burden of paying a
judgment. First, a defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff has
not met his burden of proof.37 Second, a seller can show that the
plaintiff had assumed the risk in using the allegedly dangerous
product.38 Finally, and of greater importance, defendants found lia-
29. See, e.g., Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co., 586 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1978); Nanda v. Ford
Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974); Coleman v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 64 Ill. App.
3d 974, 382 N.E. 2d 36 (1978); Stahl v. Ford Motor Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 919, 381 N.E. 2d 1211
(1978); Martinet v. International Harvester Co., 53 I1. App. 3d 213, 368 N.E.2d 496 (1977);
Allen v. Kewanee Mach. & Conveyor Co., 23 Ill. App. 3d 158, 318 N.E.2d 696 (1974).
30. See, e.g., McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965); Dunham v.
Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 111. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969); Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Spotz v. Up-Right, Inc., 3 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 280
N.E.2d 23 (1972); Noncek v. Ram Tool Corp., 129 Ill. App. 2d 320, 264 N.E.2d 440 (1970).
31. See note 23, supra.
32. See, e.g., Knapp v. Hertz Corp., 59 Ill. App. 3d 241, 375 N.E.2d 1349 (1978); Woodill
v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1978); Ostendorf v. Brewer, 51 Ill.
App. 3d 1009, 367 N.E.2d 214 (1977); Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 635,
340 N.E.2d 276 (1975).
33. See, e.g., Woodrick v. Smith Gas Serv., Inc., 87 Ill. App. 2d 88, 230 N.E.2d 508 (1967).
34. See, e.g., Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 111. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971).
35. In comparison, if an installer creates an unreasonably dangerous condition, his liabil-
ity lies for his own acts, and not those of any previous sellers. Because the installer sits at
the "bottom" of a chain of distribution, he is the only person subject to strict liability. See,
e.g., Woodrick v. Smith Gas Serv., Inc., 87 Ill. App. 2d 88, 230 N.E.2d 508 (1967).
36. Since the §402A strict products liability theory provides a plaintiff with a powerful
weapon, there existed apprehension that sellers would be considered absolute insurers of their
products. The supreme court's decision in Suvada dispelled this misplaced apprehension.
Although strict liability is "liability without fault", there are still certain essential facts which
must be proved before liability can attach. Thus, "[tihe plaintiffs must prove that their
injury or damage resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an unrea-
sonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's
control." Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
37. For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, he must meet the burden of proving
the essential elements of a strict products liability action. See notes 11 through 16 supra and
accompanying text.
38. Assumption of the risk inherent in the use of a product involves a subjective determi-
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ble can attempt to "pass on" liability to another party.
Until recently, an indemnification 39 action was the primary, if not
only, method by which a defendant could pass on liability. In such
an action, a defendant can seek indemnity from any party who was
"upstream" 0 in the chain of distribution of the product. In this way,
the defendant, though held liable, can relieve his duty to pay a
judgment. Thus, the financial burden of the plaintiff's injury pro-
perly falls on the party originally responsible for the defect.' In
addition, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently sanctioned an-
other method to pass on liability: "downstream 42 contribution . 3
nation as to whether an injured party made a conscious voluntary decision to proceed in the
face of danger. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I1. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Barr
v. Rivinius, Inc. 58 Ill. App. 3d 121, 373 N.E.2d 1063 (1978); Doran v. Pullman Standard Car
Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 981, 360 N.E.2d 440 (1977); Bittner v. Wheel Horse Products, Inc.,
28 Ill. App. 3d 44, 328 N.E.2d 160 (1975).
Inasmuch as the decision to use a product known or suspected to be dangerous must be
voluntary, assumption of risk does not apply to those plaintiffs who are exposed to dangerous
products as a condition of their employment. See Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 379
N.E.2d 281 (1978); Coty v. U. S. Slicing Mach. Co., Inc., 58 Ill. App. 3d 237, 373 N.E.2d 1371
(1978).
Further, in order to determine whether a plaintiff had appreciated the risk, certain factors,
including age, experience, knowledge, and understanding, must be examined. Williams v.
Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Karabatsos v. Spivey Co., 49 Ill. App.
3d 317, 364 N.E.2d 319 (1977).
39. "Indemnity" as applied in strict liability differs from the concept as applied in
negligence actions. In negligence, one defendant is able to totally reallocate loss to another if
the former party was "passively" negligent while the latter was "actively" negligent. How-
ever, under a strict liability theory, "fault" is not an element in a cause of action. Indemnity
in strict liability actions involves passing on ,the loss to a party originally responsible for
creating the unreasonably dangerous condition.
See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co. 62 Ill. 2d 77, 82, 338
N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975), quoting with approval, 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, § 16A (4)(b)(1).
40. "Upstream" refers to the direction in which a product travels in a chain of distribu-
tion. It means, "against the flow of commerce within the chain, i.e., purchaser-seller-
manufacturer. Downstream directly correlates to the flow of the goods through commerce.
Courts allowed recovery through indemnification when the action was upstream." Note:
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Co.: Adoption of Contribution in Illinois, 9 Loy.
CHI. L.J. 1015, 1024 n. 54 (1978).
41. See note 39 supra.
42. "Downstream" refers to the direction in which a product passes through commerce.
See note 40 supra.
43. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Pkge. Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1978).
In addition, the Illinois legislature has just enacted a contribution statute. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 70, §301 et seq. (Smith-Hurd).
Skinner was an action in strict products liability. The plaintiff, by her mother and next
friend, alleged that the injection molding machine which she had been using was unreasona-
bly dangerous and the proximate cause of her injuries. She sued the manufacturer of the
machine to recover damages for her personal injuries. The manufacturer then filed a third
party action against the plaintiff's employer, seeking contribution from the employer for its
alleged negligence which was claimed to have contributed to the plaintiff's injury.
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Thus, downstream parties who have negligently contributed to the
plaintiff's injury may be subject to a contribution action by other
defendants.
Although upstream indemnification totally reallocates the eco-
nomic loss to the party originally responsible for the unreasonably
dangerous product,44 contribution apportions the loss among parties
according to relative fault.45 However, both actions involve the ap-
plication of equitable principles to reallocate loss after liability has
been established.4 6
HUNT V. BLASIUS
Recently, in Hunt v. Blasius,47 an Illinois Appellate Court applied
the equitable principles underlying contribution and indemnity
prior to a finding of liability. It thereby established a new, complete
defense to a strict liability action. Specifically, the court held that
under certain circumstances an independent contractor will not be
held liable for injuries resulting from design defects when the design
is supplied by a governmental entity.48 The pivotal rationale for this
new defense stems from the independent contractor's complete lack
of control over the design of the product which he manufacturers.
In Hunt, the plaintiff's car struck a sign pole located two feet from
the shoulder of an Illinois highway, resulting in the death of two of
the car's occupants and serious injury to three other passengers. The
plaintiffs brought an action on both negligence and strict liability
grounds, alleging that defendant's sign pole was defective in design,
construction and installation. Specifically, plaintiff claimed the
pole failed to conform to modern standards of highway construction,
The employer moved to dismiss the third party complaint. The trial court denied this
motion. Both the appellate court and supreme court affirmed, thereby apparently permitting
actions for contribution for actions arising out of occurrences on and after March 1, 1978. See
also cases cited at note 2 supra.
44. See note 39 supra.
45. As the court stated in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Pkge. Mach. Co., 70 I1. 2d 1,
374 N.E.2d 437 (1978):
For the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the allegations of fact in the third-
party complaint must be taken as true ... , and on these facts the governing
equitable principles require that ultimate liability for plaintiff's injuries be appor-
tioned on the basis of the relative degree to which the defective product and the
employer's conduct proximately caused them.
Id. at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 442 (citations omitted). See also notes 2 and 43 supra.
46. See note 2 supra.
47. 55 I1. App. 3d 14, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977), aff'd on other grounds, 74 I1. 2d 203, 384
N.E.2d 368 (1978).
48. 55 Il. App. 3d at 17, 370 N.E.2d at 620.
49. Id. at 19-20, 370 N.E.2d 617, 621.
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because the pole was not designed to break away on impact. 5
The defendant argued that since he was an independent contrac-
tor manufacturing a product in strict compliance with a design
mandated by the State of Illinois he could not be held liable for any
defects in that design."' The trial court agreed and granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment. 2 This decision was af-
firmed by the appellate court, which held that the contractor, who
had complied with strict governmental specifications and had no
control over the product's design, could assert a complete defense
to a strict products liability action.53
Central to the court's analysis was the status of the independent
contractor. Analogizing to traditional negligence concepts, the sta-
tus of the independent contractor was deemed dispositivell because
the defendant was a "mere conduit." 5 In reaching this conclusion,
the appellate court relied heavily on the decision in Littlehale v.
E.I.DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. 51 There, on basically the same
probative facts, 5 the court determined that a manufacturer who
50. The original complaint was filed against four parties; however, an amended complaint
named only the manufacturer-installer, Fosco Fabricators, 55 Ill. App. 3d at 15, 370 N.E.2d
at 618.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to follow "modem meth-
ods of highway construction" which included the erection of "breakaway" poles, and other-
wise negligently constructing, designing and controlling the pole. The strict liability count
alleged that the pole was unreasonably dangerous because it was not of a "breakaway" design
and because it was anchored in concrete within three feet of the roadway. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Summary judgment was granted on both the negligence and strict liability counts.
For the purpose of this article, except where specifically noted, only the strict liability count
and the new defense generated by it will be discussed.
53. Hunt v. Blasius, 55 Il. App. 3d 14, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977).
54. Traditionally a party acting as a conduit was found liable, but was allowed to seek
indemnity from a party further up in the chain of distribution. See, e.g., Sam Shainberg Co.
of Jackson v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972) However, the conduit in Hunt was allowed
to escape liability totally. Rather than force the contractor to seek indemnification for judg-
ments entered, the contractor was permitted to raise a complete defense to the action.
55. It is unclear to what extent the Court may have been influenced by the Illinois'
immunity statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, §801 (1178). Under this statute, any claim against
the State of Illinois can only be filed with the Court of Claims under the provisions of ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 439.1 et seq (1978). It is possible that the court did not want to subject
the manufacturer to the jurisdiction limitations of the Court of Claims. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, § 439.8(d) (1978). If the manufacturer in Hunt could have obtained indemnity from the
State, its recovery would have been limited to $100,000.)
56. 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
57. In Littlehale, the plaintiffs were civilian employees of the United States Navy. They
were injured by blasting caps which had been manufactured thirteen years earlier according
to specifications supplied by the war department. In the course of the litigation, the plaintiffs
abaondoned a negligence claim. Instead, they based their action exclusively upon a strict
liability theory for a failure to warn of the nature of the product. The court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that the defendant owed the plaintiffs no duty to warn
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controls the production of goods is distinct from one who contracts
to provide a unique product for a specific purchaser. Thus, the
Littlehale court reasoned, when a specific purchaser demands strict
compliance with his own plans and specifications, the manufacturer
should be held to a different standard of liability. 58
Further, the Hunt court also adopted the Littlehale "ordinary
prudent manufacturer" standard of liability for the independent
contractor. 59 Under this rule, an independent contractor who manu-
facturers a product according to another's designs will escape liabil-
ity unless those designs are so glaringly or patently insufficient that
an ordinary and prudent manufacturer would not follow them."0
The Hunt appellate court decision essentially carves out an ex-
ception to the strict liability principles enumerated in Suvada. The
court examined the policy rationales of Suvada, but it found them
inapplicable.6 Specifically, the court noted that the product was
not produced with the intention of soliciting the public to purchase
or use it, nor were representations concerning the safety of the prod-
uct made to the general public. 2 Thus, the manufacturer was not
directly enriched at the expense of the public. 3 In addition, the
contractor was not responsible for and could not alter the product's
injurious design.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling,
because the product was not manufactured for sale or resale to the general public and was
known to be dangerous. Furthermore, the defendant had no discretion in selection of methods
of manufacture, design, or use of materials. 268 F. Supp. at 801-802.
58. The Littlehale court stated:
Thus it seemed that the duty imposed in these situations is somewhat less than
the duty imposed where the manufacturer does the work as he desires, not being
bound by specifications of another. For if the duty where he has control were the
same as the duty where he is controlled by another, the general ordinary prudent
man test would be applicable without the limitation imposed by the "glaring,
obvious or patent" adjectives which appear to lessen his duty and impose liability
on the manufacturer in only the extreme case.
Id. at 802 n.16.
See also, Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975); Sanner v. Ford
Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976); But cf. Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d
765 (8th Cir. 1976). Contra, Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).
59. Hunt v. Blasius, 55 II1. App. 3d 14, 18, 370 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1978).
60. Id. See note 58 supra.
61. Id.
62. The court stated, "In Illinois, Suvada made clear that all persons in the chain of
distribution from the manufacturer on down have potential liability, but Suvada was con-
cerned with products designed and sole [sic] for use by the general public and not for use
by a governmental entity and to its specifications." Hunt v. Blasius, 55 Ill. App. 3d 14, 19,
370 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1978). The policy considerations underlying Suvada are discussed in the
text accompanying notes 7 and 8 supra.
63. 55 Ill. App. 3d at 19, 370 N.E.2d at 621.
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but upon the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove that there was
a design defect." In basing its decision on the plaintiff's failure to
meet their burden of proof, the supreme court failed to address the
merits of the independent contractor defense as articulated by the
appellate court. Yet, since the new defense was neither expressly
overruled nor affirmed the defense would seem to be good law; how-
ever, its application remains uncertain.
FUTURE OF THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
Although the supreme court did not rule on the new strict liability
defense, the recent Illinois cases which have accepted contribution
among joint tortfeasors may indicate a more receptive attitude to
the application of equitable principles in strict liability actions.'5 It
is conceivable, therefore, that the Illinois Supreme Court will en-
dorse this new defense when confronted with an appropriate fact
situation."
As with any innovation in the law, this new defense presents both
potential problems and benefits. The primary benefit stems from
the fact that manufacturers of sui generis? products are instrumen-
64. Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1979). In its treatment of the strict
liability count, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs' complaint did not allege a distinct
defect, but only a "preference for break-away posts." 74 Ill. 2d at 212, 384 N.E.2d at 372.
See also note 50 supra.
Therefore, because the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof, the court was able to
dispose of the strict liability count without directly addressing the merits of the appellate
court arguments supporting the independent contractor defense.
In regard to the negligence count, the court expressed its agreement with other jurisdictions
which have held that an independent contractor is not liable in negligence to third persons,
under a rationale similar to the one applied by the appellate court to the strict liability count.
Id. at 210, 384 N.E.2d at 371-72.
It is this author's opinion that the same rationale would apply to a strict liability action.
Unfortunately, however, the Court disposed of the action without the necessity of deciding
the applicability of such a standard in strict liability.
65. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
66. An appropriate fact situation would, obviously, be an action in which the plaintiffs
plead properly and succeeded in meeting their burden of proof. In addition, this issue is ripe
for consideration by the Illinois legislation. The prospects of such action are heightened in
light of the recent enactment of the contribution among joint tortfeasors statute. ILL. ANN
STAT ch. 70, §§ 301 et seq. (1979).
Tennessee has recently come close to offering a statuatory defense to manufacturers that
comply with governmental specifications. 1978 Tenn. Pub Acts §23-3704 provides:
Compliance by a manufacturer or seller with any federal or state statutes or
administrative regulations existing at the time a product was manufactured and
prescribing standards for design, inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling, warn-
ing or instructions for use of a product, shall raise a rebuttable presumption that
the product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition in regard to matters
covered by these standards.
67. "Sui generis" is defined, "of its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its kind;
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tal in producing goods and machines that are used in new industrial
processes and techniques.68 Since the defense eliminates one theory
by which an independent contractor can be held strictly liable,"5 it
may encourage independent contractors to enter into the manufac-
ture of sui generis products. Any resulting promotion of new in-
dustrial techniques, of course, will benefit both industry and society
as a whole. 0
One problem with this defense is that it diminishes the availabil-
ity of compensation to an injured party who pursues a strict liability
action. Since the defense is premised upon the limited distribution
of a unique product,7' there will be fewer potential sellers to join as
defendents. Thus, even if a plaintiff succeeds in. obtaining a judg-
ment he will be unable to seek recovery against the broad range of
parties typically available in the chain of distribution. Instead, a
plaintiff's recovery will most often be limited to the product's de-
signer.12 In certain instances the designer may be judgment proof or,
in the case of a governmental entity, immune from suit.73 However,
this would not be the first theory by which an otherwise deserving
plaintiff would be denied recovery in a strict liability suit; recovery
also is denied against occasional sellers of unreasonably dangerous
products.7"
peculiar." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1602 (4th ed. 1968).
68. It is envisioned that in many instances where a new industrial process is invented,
new machinery for the effectuation of the process will have to be designed. If a patent holder
or licensee of the patent holder, for example, supplies the plans and specifications for the new
machine to an independent contractor who is hired to produce the machine, the patent holder
or his licensee, not the independent contractor, should bear the burden of defending a strict
tort liability action if a person is injured because of a design in that machine.
69. For a discussion of the defects which can render a party strictly liable, see notes 29
through 34 supra and accompanying text.
70. Several courts in other jurisdictions have recently adopted a test which balances the
risks of a product against its utility. See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 550 P.2d 1065 (Ariz. 1976); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269
Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
In this author's opinion, a consideration of a product's utility to society as a whole will
better serve the general public than a blind examination of a product's dangerous nature. See
generally INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE 11-8-10
(1979), and authorities cited therein.
71. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
72. Since a sui generis product is manufactured for the benefit of a single purchaser, who
is also the designer, the "chain of distribution" is limited to those two parties. If the manufac-
turer has the protection of the defense raised in Hunt, an injured third person, such as a
bystander or employee of the manufacturer, could only pursue a strict liability action against
the designer-purchaser.
73. Actions against the State of Illinois, for example, are limited by the sovereign immun-
ity statute discussed at note 70 supra.
74. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §402A Comment f (1965) states, in pertinent
part:
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Occasional sellers are not held strictly liable because they are not
within the category of persons in the business of selling products to
the public and because purchasers are not forced to rely upon the
safety of an occasional seller's product.75 Similarly, an independent
contractor manufacturing a specific, non-consumer product accord-
ing to a designer's specifications is not in the business of selling that
product to the public. Further, the purchaser of that product is not
forced to rely on the contractor. In fact, the purchaser has sought
out the contractor to do its work. Thus, although an injured plaintiff
may be quite limited in recovery if an independent contractor is able
to use this new defense, the rationale of the imposition of strict
liability simply does not apply to the contractor manufacturing a
specific, non-consumer product according to governmental design.
In addition, although Illinois recognition of this defense extends
only to designs supplied by governmental entities," at least one
other court has applied the defense to a manufacturer who complied
with a private party's specifications." Since the equities inherent in
The rule does not, however, apply to the occasional seller of food or other such
products who is not engaged in that activity as a part of his business. Thus it does
not apply to the housewife who, on one occasion, sells to her neighbor a jar of jam
or a pound of sugar. Nor does it apply to the owner of an automobile who, on one
occasion, sells it to his neighbor, or even sells it to a dealer in used cars, and this
even though he is fully aware that the dealer plans to resell it. The basis for the
rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety of the public
undertaken by one who enters into the business of supplying human beings with
products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the
forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods.
This basis is lacking in the case of the ordinary individual who makes the isolated
sale, and he is not liable to a third person, or even to his buyer, in the absence of
his negligence.
75. See, e.g., Luna v. Rossville Packing Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 290, 369 N.E. 2d 612 (1977)
(sale of a conveyor constructed by cannery for its own use held to be an isolated sale not
subject to strict liability) Siemen v. Alden, 34 Ill. App. 3d 961, 341 N.E. 2d 713 (1975)
(sawmill selling a used saw held not to be in the business of selling saws.) See also Delta
Refining Co. v. Procon, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. App., 1975) (general contractor who
contracted to purchase and install a pump according to the specifications of the plaintiff's
licensor was held not to be in the business of selling such pumps and was not strictly liable
for a fire proximately caused by a design defect.)
The application of this preclusion from liability rests upon a determination of what a party
sells in the usual course of his business. Thus, while a hospital may be in the business of
selling blood for transfusions (Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill. 2d 443,
266 N.E.2d 897 (1970)), a sawmill owner is not in the business of selling a used saw (Siemen
v. Alden, 34 Il. App. 3d 961, 341 N.E.2d 713 (1975)).
76. The appellate court in Hunt specifically declined to decide the issue of compliance
with private designs because the matter was not before it. Hunt v. Blasius, 55 Ill. App. 3d
14, 19, 370 N.E. 2d 617, 621 (1977).
77. Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F. 2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973). In Spangler, the plaintiff was
a pipefitter who was struck by an overhead crane which was manufactured by the defendant
in accordance with the plans and specifications of the plaintiff's employer. The plaintiff
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permitting an independent contractor to assert this defense when it
has dealt with the government are the same as when it has con-
tracted with a private party, the Hunt defense should not be limited
to governmental design cases.
CONCLUSION
The independent contractor defense adopted by the appellate
court in Hunt v. Blasius represents a reasonable limitation on Illi-
nois strict products liability actions. By protecting the independent
contractor of sui generis products, this defense does not contravene
the public policy considerations discussed in Suvada v. White
Motor Co. Rather, it recognizes that those considerations do not
apply to every product and every manufacturer or seller. The new
defense also considers the equitable principles of protecting parties
not originally responsible for creating an unreasonably dangerous
product. Of course, the spectre of the uncompensated plaintiff is
disturbing. However, the equities underlying the defense and its
potential societal benefits compel the defense's complete recogni-
tion by the Illinois Supreme Court.
WILLIAM T. GOTFRYD
alleged negligence on the part of the manufacturer for failing to provide a bell or warning
device, the absence of which made the crane unreasonably dangerous. The district court judge
directed a verdict for the manufacturer, which order was affirmed on appeal.
Although Spangler was a negligence action, the plaintiffs asked the court on review to
consider a strict liability theory as an alternative basis for finding the defendant liable. The
court stated that the independent contractor defense was a complete defense to a strict
liability theory as well as a negligence theory. Spangler resulted, then, in the expansion of
the Littlehale defense to include those independent contractors/manufacturers who comply
with non-governmental designs.
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